haku: @author Li, D. / yhteensä: 6
viite: 5 / 6
| Tekijä: | Cornelli, F. Li, D. |
| Otsikko: | Large shareholders, private benefits of control, and optimal schemes of privatization |
| Lehti: | RAND Journal of Economics
1997 : WINTER, VOL. 28:4, p. 585-604 |
| Asiasana: | SHAREHOLDERS CONTROL PRIVATIZATION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors analyze optimal schemes for privatization of state enterprises when foreign investors are potential buyers. The highest bidders may not be the best large shareholders for the state enterprise, since their bid may reflect only their high private benefit of control. The government finds itself facing a tradeoff between trying to obtain the highest possible payment (the "revenue" objective) and identifying the company that will operate better in the future (the "efficiency" objective). |
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