haku: @author Sjöström, T. / yhteensä: 6
viite: 5 / 6
| Tekijä: | Baliga, S. Sjöström, T. |
| Otsikko: | Decentralization and collusion |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economic Theory
1998 : DEC, VOL. 83:2, p. 196-232 |
| Asiasana: | Decentralisation Information Contracts Models |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | In the paper, a model is considered where agents work in sequence on a project, share information not available to the principal, and can collude. Due to limited liability the Coase theorem does not apply. The distribution of surplus among the agents is therefore an important control variable for the principal, which gives this paper a theory of how to delegate in an organization subject to moral hazard. The optimal distribution of surplus can always be achieved by delegating in the right way (decentralization) without using "message games." |
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