haku: @author Sjöström, T. / yhteensä: 6
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Tekijä:Ghatak, M.
Morelli, M.
Sjöström, T.
Otsikko:Occupational choice and dynamic incentives
Lehti:Review of Economic Studies
2001 : OCT, VOL. 68:4(237), s. 781-810
Asiasana:AGENCY THEORY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
INCENTIVES
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE
OVERLAPPING-GENERATIONS MODELS
WORKERS
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:The authors study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market give rise to rents in entrepreneurial activities involving capital.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 229043
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