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| Tekijä: | Dickhut, J. McCabe, K. Mukherji, A. |
| Otsikko: | An experimental study of strategic information transmission |
| Lehti: | Economic Theory
1995 : VOL. 6:3, p. 389-403 |
| Asiasana: | STRATEGY INFORMATION EXAMINATIONS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in pay-offs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. The authors vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. The authors examine the relationships between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data. |
SCIMA