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| Tekijä: | Veugelers, R. Vandenbussche, H. |
| Otsikko: | European anti-dumping policy and the profitability of national and international collusion |
| Lehti: | European Economic Review
1999 : JAN, VOL. 43:1, p. 1-28 |
| Asiasana: | DUMPING REGULATIONS MARKET STRUCTURE WELFARE RENTS EUROPE |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The paper is the first to study the effect of European antidumping policy on market structure. The incentives for firms to engage in a domestic or international cartel of implicit collusion in a multi-stage setting is analyzed. Also, the influence of European antidumping policy on the incentives for firms to collude domestically or internationally is examined. The question whether antidumping regulation helps establish, maintain or rather endanger full cartels as well as cartels restricted to domestic firms only is tackled. Findings of the study suggest that antidumping legislation can both have a procompetitive and an anticompetitive effect. |
SCIMA