haku: @indexterm COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS / yhteensä: 61
viite: 3 / 61
| Tekijä: | Bardhan, P. Ghatak, M. Karaivanov, A. |
| Otsikko: | Wealth inequality and collective action |
| Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
2007 : SEP, VOL. 91:9, p. 1843-1874 |
| Asiasana: | collective agreements efficiency inequality public goods |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This article examines the effect of inequality in the distribution of private inputs that are complementary in prodction with collective inputs on efficiency in a class of collective action problems. Making distinction between contributors and non-contributors, the authors seek to characterize the joint surplus maximizing level of inequality. This is done in a framework that enables to consider many collective action problems alternating from pure public goods to impure public goods to commons. The results show that albeit greater inequality within the groups of contributors and non-contributors improves efficiency, there exists an optimal degree of inequality between these groups. |
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