haku: @indexterm spatial economics / yhteensä: 62
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| Tekijä: | Gross, J. Holahan, W. L. |
| Otsikko: | Credible collusion in spatially separated markets |
| Lehti: | International Economic Review
2003 : FEB, VOL. 44:1, 299-312 |
| Asiasana: | Spatial economics Economic geography Transport |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | In an infinitely repeated game, sellers employ a trigger strategy of mutual forbearance invasion of each other's markets, stabilized against invasion by the threat of Bertrand pricing. Contrary to conventional static models, this article shows stability for a wide range of transportation costs and present value parameters, and that increases in transportation costs tend to destabilize the collusive agreement. |
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