haku: @journal_id 577 / yhteensä: 643
viite: 17 / 643
Tekijä: | Grimm, V. Riedel, F. Wolfstetter, E. |
Otsikko: | Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany |
Lehti: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
2003 : DEC, VOL. 21:10, p. 1557-1569 |
Asiasana: | Auctions Bidding Telecommunication Industrial organization Game theory |
Kieli: | eng |
Tiivistelmä: | The second-generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. In this paper it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids. |
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