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Tekijä:Chu, K. H.
Otsikko:Free banking and information asymmetry
Lehti:Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
1999 : NOV, VOL. 31:4, p. 748-762
Asiasana:Banking
Market information
Market conditions
Investor protection
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:The paper shows that in a separating equilibrium a higher-quality bank offers a lower deposit rate and holds a smaller proportion of risky loans than a lower-quality bank to signal its underlying quality. Hence, free banking is not inherently unstable. The empirical results for the Hong Kong banking system during 1984-65 are consistent with the hypothesis of a separating equilibrium.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 202590
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