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Tekijä:Sibert, A.
Otsikko:Monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences
Lehti:European Economic Review
2002 : JUN, VOL. 46:6, p. 1093-1109
Asiasana:CENTRAL BANKS
MONETARY POLICY
SIGNALING
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This paper considers monetary policy when policy makers' preferences are private information. The author shows that in the first period of a two-period term, all policy makers but the least inflation averse inflate less - but respond more to shocks - than if there were no private information. Moderately inflation-averse policy makers may reduce their inflation most.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 233733
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