haku: @indexterm signaling / yhteensä: 68
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| Tekijä: | Deutsch, Y. Ross, T.W. |
| Otsikko: | You are known by the directors you keep: reputable directors as a signaling mechanism for young firms |
| Lehti: | Management Science
2003 : AUG, VOL. 49:8, p. 1003-1017 |
| Asiasana: | Directors New enterprise Quality Reputation Signaling |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | An analytical model of outside directors' signaling role, a role that is especially important for entrepreneurial companies, is developed in this article. The authors formally demonstrate that in the face of a market failure in which stakeholders refuse to align themselves with new companies, high-quality new ventures may be able to credibly signal their type by appointing reputable directors to their boards. However, this option is not universally feasible. Both directors' reputations and the quality of their information determine the effectiveness of this strategy. Controversially with earlier adverse selection models, it is demonstrated that when the middlemen (directors) have incomplete information on company quality, bad and good companies can coexist in equilibrium. |
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