haku: @journal_id 62 / yhteensä: 680
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| Tekijä: | Agrawal, A. |
| Otsikko: | Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders |
| Lehti: | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
1996 : SEP, VOL. 31:3, p. 377-398 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS RESEARCH MANAGERS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper examines the use of seven mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. These mechanisms are: shareholdings of insiders, institutions, and large blockholders; use of outside directors; debt policy, the managerial labour market; and the market for corporate control. The authors present direct empirical evidence of interdependence among these mechanisms in a large sample of firms. This finding suggests that cross-sectional OLS regressions of firm performance on single mechanisms may be misleading. |
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