haku: @author Szymanski, S. / yhteensä: 7
viite: 4 / 7
| Tekijä: | Szymanski, S. |
| Otsikko: | Strategic delegation with endogenous costs: a duopoly with wage bargaining |
| Lehti: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
1994 : MAR, VOL. 12:1, p. 105-116 |
| Asiasana: | DUOPOLY PAY BARGAINING |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper examines the owners' problem of strategic delegation when managers choose the level of sales and are responsible for cost control. In this paper the cost structure as well as sales depends on the choices of managers. Owners want managers to act more like profit maximizers when cost control is important. This issue is analysed in the context of a model with union bargaining. In the model it is shown that stronger unions may benefit owners because of the strategic incentive setting process. |
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