haku: @author Caillaud, B. / yhteensä: 7
viite: 7 / 7
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| Tekijä: | Caillaud, B. Jullien, B. |
| Otsikko: | Managerial incentives based on acquisition of information |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
1995 : FALL, VOL. 4:3, p. 427-444 |
| Asiasana: | INFORMATION MERGERS INCENTIVES MANAGEMENT |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | In a moral hazard setting, the authors model the fact that the agent may get private signals about the final outcome of his effort before the public realization of this outcome. Actions affect both the distribution of the outcome and the quality of the agent's private information. The authors compare simple contracts, based on output only, with revelation contracts, based on output and messages about signals. |
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