haku: @author Moore, W. / yhteensä: 7
viite: 2 / 7
Tekijä:Lippert, R.
Moore, W.
Otsikko:Monitoring versus bonding: shareholder rights and management compensation
Lehti:Financial Management
1995 : AUTUMN, VOL. 24:3, p. 54-62
Asiasana:FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
SHAREHOLDERS
RIGHTS ISSUES
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:Using a sample of nearly 700 firms, the authors document a significant level of substitution between monitoring efforts by shareholders and bonding of Chief Executive Officers' (CEO) compensation with shareholder wealth. Direct shareholder monitoring effectiveness is measured by various dimensions of voting rights, e.g., equal voting, cumulative voting, and confidential voting. Indirect monitoring is measured by the degree of independence of the board of directors.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 142715
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