haku: @author Slade, M. / yhteensä: 7
viite: 5 / 7
Tekijä:Slade, M.
Otsikko:Multiask agency and contact choice: an empirical exploration
Lehti:International Economic Review
1996 : MAY, VOL. 37:2, p. 465-486
Asiasana:ECONOMICS
INTERNATIONAL
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:The multiask-agency problem is examined empirically using contracts between private, integrated oil companies and their service stations in the city of Vancouver. The empirical tests assess how variations in the characteristics of one task affect the choice of agent-compensation scheme for another. Comparative statics from the model predict that higher-powered incentives will be offered for gasoline sales when the secondary activity is not highly complementary with gasoline retailing, where complementarity is measured by the cross-price demand effect.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 149978
lisää koriin
SCIMA