haku: @author Cowen, T. / yhteensä: 7
viite: 4 / 7
| Tekijä: | Cowen, T. Glazer, A. |
| Otsikko: | More monitoring can induce less effort |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
1996 : JUL, VOL. 30:1, p. 113-124 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS AGENCY THEORY MODELS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | If an agent's compensation decreases sharply for observed shirking rates above a critical level, shirking may increase the more information the principal has about the agent. Furthermore, monitoring decisions may be deliberately assigned to poorly informed principals. Compensation methods that disregard some information may be optimal. Signals about the agent may reduce the expected profits of the principal. Common wisdom in the economics literature suggests that the less the principal knows about the activities of his agents, the more agents will shirk. |
SCIMA