haku: @author Beetsma, R. / yhteensä: 7
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| Tekijä: | Beetsma, R. Bovenberg, A. |
| Otsikko: | Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers |
| Lehti: | Journal of International Economics
1998 : AUG, VOL. 45:2, p. 239-258 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL POLICY MAKING |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | With benevolent policymakers and fiscal leadership, monetary unification reduces inflation, taxes and public spending. These disciplining effects of a monetary union, which become stronger if the number of participants in the union increases, are likely to raise welfare. Two types of arrangements are considered for the union's common central bank (CCB): making the CCB more conservative and imposing an inflation target on the CCB. An optimally designed, conservative CCB may outperform inflation targeting. |
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