haku: @author Jensen, H. / yhteensä: 7
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| Tekijä: | Beetsma, R. M. W. J. Jensen, H. |
| Otsikko: | Inflation targets and contracts with uncertain central banker preferences. |
| Lehti: | Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
1998 : AUG, VOL.30:3:1, p. 384-403 |
| Asiasana: | Central banks Inflation Contracts |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Within a standard model of monetary delegation the authors show that the optimal linear inflation contract performs strictly better than the optimal inflation target when there is uncertainty about the central bankers' preferences. The optimal combination of a contract and a target performs best and eliminates the inflation bias and any variability not associated with supply shocks. |
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