haku: @author Schnitzer, M. / yhteensä: 7
viite: 4 / 7
| Tekijä: | Schnitzer, M. |
| Otsikko: | Expropriation and control rights: a dynamic model of foreign direct investment |
| Lehti: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
1999 : NOV, VOL. 17:8, p. 1113-1137 |
| Asiasana: | INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION FOREIGN INVESTMENT MODELS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper stuides the strategic interaction between a foreign direct investor and a host country. The author analyzes how the investor can use his control rights to protect his investment if he faces the risk of "creeping expropriation" once his investment is sunk. It is shown that this hold-up problem may cause underinvestment if the outside option of the investor is too weak, and overinvestment if it is too strong. The author also analyzes the impact of spillover effects, gives a rationale for "tax holidays" and examines how stochastic returns affect the strategic interaction of investor and host country. |
SCIMA