haku: @author Hellmann, T. / yhteensä: 7
viite: 6 / 7
| Tekijä: | Hellmann, T. |
| Otsikko: | Liberalization, moral hazard in banking, and prudential regulation: are capital requirements enough? |
| Lehti: | American Economic Review
2000 : MAR, VOL. 90:1, p. 147-165 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS BANKING MORAL HAZARD |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | In a dynamic model of moral hazard, competition can undermine prudent bank behavior. While capital-requirement regulation can induce prudent behavior, the policy yields Pareto-efficient outcomes. Capital requirements reduce gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk. However, they also have a perverse effect of harming banks' franchise values, thus encouraging gambling. Pareto-efficient outcomes can be achieved by adding deposit-rate controls as a regulatory instrument, since they facilitate prudent investment by increasing franchise values. |
SCIMA