haku: @author Frick, B. / yhteensä: 7
viite: 2 / 7
| Tekijä: | Frick, B. Dilger, A. Prinz, J. |
| Otsikko: | Arbeitsmarktregulierung und nachvertraglicher Opportunismus: Die Verhaltensfolgen garantierter Handgeldzahlungen in der National Football League |
| Lehti: | Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft
2002 : VOL. 72:4, p. 163-180 |
| Asiasana: | LABOUR MARKETS COMPANIES SPORTS INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL |
| Kieli: | ger |
| Tiivistelmä: | Labor market institutions have a predictable influence on the behavior of firms and workers. If the institutional environment is changing, rational actors will immediately adapt to the new circumstances. Using data from the "National Football League", the authors analyse the influence on team performance of the introduction of a binding cap on team salaries. The only legal way to circumvent or partly avoid the salary cap regulations is by paying signing bonuses to free agents. These bonuses are only partly considered when a team's total wage bill is calculated. However, circumventing the salary cap may not be costless, because guaranteed up-front payments that are not related to actual performance may lead to player opportunism, i.e. reduced effort levels (original in German). |
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