haku: @author Kennan, J. / yhteensä: 7
viite: 6 / 7
| Tekijä: | Kennan, J. Wilson, R. |
| Otsikko: | Can strategic bargaining models explain collective bargaining data? |
| Lehti: | American Economic Review
1990 : MAY, VOL. 80:2, p. 405-409 |
| Asiasana: | COLLECTIVE BARGAINING INFORMATION INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS TRADE UNIONS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Prospective interactions between the theoretical models of strategic bargaining with private information, and empirical analysis of data on collective bargaining in the labour market are discussed. The style is expository, i.e. detailed arguments have been ruthlessly suppressed. The theoretical models deal with conflicts between rational bargainers; it is explained why private information is important in building models of strikes. In naive models of collective bargaining, the union starts with a tough demand, and the firm starts with a low offer; later the union reduces its demand, and the firm increases its offer, until eventually the resistence and the concession curves intersect, and a deal is made. Some real case examples are shown. |
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