haku: @author Evans, R. / yhteensä: 73
viite: 4 / 73
Tekijä:Evans, R.
Otsikko:Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers
Lehti:Games and Economic Behavior
1997 : MAY, VOL. 19:2, p. 211-220
Asiasana:GAMES
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR
COMPETITION
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This paper analyzes a simple discrete-time noncooperative coalitional bargaining game in which, at each stage, there is a contest for the right to make a proposal. The pure stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium payoff set is equal to the core. The core is motivated by a simple and intuitive informal story but unless there exist natural noncooperative bargaining games which deliver the core, in which the possibilities for making offers and counteroffers are explicitly modelled, its appeal must be considerably weakened.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 160969
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