haku: @indexterm duopoly / yhteensä: 79
viite: 3 / 79
Tekijä:Simbanegavi, W.
Otsikko:Informative advertising, competition or cooperation?
Lehti:Journal of Industrial Economics
2009 : MAR, VOL 57:1 p. 147-166
Asiasana:advertising
communication
duopoly
welfare loss
Vapaa asiasana:collusion
cooperation
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:A duopoly version of the Grossman and Shapiro [1984] model of informative advertising is created. There, firms' incentives to semicollude on advertising and its welfare implications are examined. It is found that, relative to the non-cooperative result, semicollusion on advertising is more lucrative but also detrimental to welfare. It is also found that when the advertising cost is ‘low,’ advertising semicollusion harms welfare more than price semicollusion. These findings are important for competition policy, since traditionally cooperative advertising has not been treated similarly to price collusion.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 275157
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