haku: @author Reichelstein, S. / yhteensä: 8
viite: 2 / 8
| Tekijä: | Reichelstein, S. |
| Otsikko: | Providing managerial incentives: cash flows versus accural accounting |
| Lehti: | Journal of Accounting Research
2000 : AUTUMN, VOL. 38:2, p. 243-270 |
| Asiasana: | USA STOCK MARKETS EARNINGS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper analyzes a principal-agent model in which the agent (manager) can exert effort in every period in order to gain access to some investment opportunity. He or she then decides whether the firm undertakes the opportunity. The analysis focuses on satisfactory incentive schemes which motivate the manager to exert effort and to invest in all profitable projects. As a consequence, the principal's gross benefit is held fixed, and the variable of interest is the resulting agency cost, i.e. the present value of all compensation payments to the manager. |
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