haku: @author Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. / yhteensä: 8
viite: 1 / 8
« edellinen | seuraava »
| Tekijä: | Chakraborty, I. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. |
| Otsikko: | Corners in auctions |
| Lehti: | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
2001 : SUMMER, VOL. 10:2, p. 265-276 |
| Asiasana: | AUCTIONS PRICING |
| Vapaa asiasana: | CORNERING |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Different pricing rules in multiunit auctions provide different incentives for a bidder to corner the auction and thus require different levels of effort from the seller to deter cornering. The authors consider three different types of auctions: the pay-your-bid or "discriminatory" auction commonly used by the US Treasury, the lowest-winning-bid uniform-price auction used in the current Treasury experiment, and the highest-losing-bid uniform-price auction considered by Vickery almost four decades ago. |
« edellinen | seuraava »
SCIMA