haku: @indexterm chief executive officers / yhteensä: 802
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| Tekijä: | Miller, J. S. Wiseman, R. M. Gomez, L. R. |
| Otsikko: | The Fit between CEO Compensation Design and Firm Risk |
| Lehti: | Academy of Management Journal
2002 : AUG, VOL. 45:4, p. 745-756 |
| Asiasana: | CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS COMPENSATION COMPANIES RISK |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors examined the effects of unsystematic and systematic firm risk on CEO compensation risk bearing and total pay. Both the proportion of variable pay in CEO pay packages and their magnitude are curvilinearly related to unsystematic firm risk-that is, they are highest under conditions of moderate firm-specific risk. Their results are consistent with agency theory predictions that both performance-contingent pay and the greater earnings potential associated with that form of pay are highest when an agent has greater control over performance outcomes. This study extends the literature on CEO pay design in several important ways. First, they use agency logic to argue that reliance on performance-contingent pay at both high and low levels of firm risk engenders agency costs for shareholders. |
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