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Tekijä:Burkart, M.
Lee, S.
Otsikko:One share - one vote: the theory
Lehti:Review of finance
2008 : VOL. 12:1, p. 1-49
Asiasana:finance
voting
shares
corporate governance
theories
Vapaa asiasana:ownership
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:There are three questions around which the theoretical literature on security-voting structure can be organized: i. What impact do non-voting shares have on takeover outcomes?, ii. How does disproportional voting power affect the incentives of blockholders?, iii. What are the repercussions of mandating one share - one vote (here as: 1-s-1-v.) for firms' financing and ownership choices?
In general, the costs and benefits of separating cash flow and votes reflect the fundamental governance trade-off btw. empowering managers and disempowering blockholders. Hence, it is an open question whether mandating 1-s-1-v. would improve the quality of corporate governance etc.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 268035
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