haku: @indexterm SUPPLY CHAIN / yhteensä: 84
viite: 19 / 84
Tekijä:Hennessy, C. A.
Livdan, D.
Otsikko:Debt, bargaining, and credibility in firm-supplier relationships
Lehti:Journal of Financial Economics
2009 : SEP, VOL 93:3, p. 382-399
Asiasana:debt
bargaining
contracts
supply chain
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This article aims to find out what is the optimal leverage for a downstream company that relies on implicit supplier contracts. According to the findings of this paper, the firm is able to increase its share of total surplus by performing a leveraged recapitalization prior to bargaining. This however, leads to debt overhang which limits the amount of credible bonuses. The model shows a leverage increase with supplier bargaining power and decrease with the use of non-verifiable inputs. Optimal financial structure is a trade-off between bargaining benefits and inefficiency caused by debt overhang.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 273183
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