haku: @indexterm individual behaviour / yhteensä: 848
viite: 33 / 848
Tekijä:Rigdon, M. L.
McCabe, K. A.
Smith, V. L.
Otsikko:Sustaining cooperation in trust games
Lehti:Economic Journal
2007 : JUL, VOL. 117:522, p. 991-1007
Asiasana:co-operation
co-operative games
individual behaviour
game theory
trust
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:Deriving from the evolutionary game theory where population clustering in Prisoner's Dilemma games permits some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies, the authors develop the idea of population clustering in a two-person trust game. In the setup the players are categorized according to their earlier behaviour as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). Trustors are then paired with trustworthy and non-trustors with untrustworthy persons. The results of the analysis are compared with control group where Players 1 are randomly repaired with Players 2. The aim is to explore whether there are natural tendencies for people to cooperate more frequently in environments in which they experience more cooperation in comparison with controls.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 266925
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