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| Tekijä: | Core, J.E. Guay, W. Verrecchia, R.E. |
| Otsikko: | Price versus non-price performance measures in optimal CEO compensation contracts |
| Lehti: | Accounting Review
2003 : OCT, VOL. 78:4, p. 957-981 |
| Asiasana: | Agency theory Chief executive officers Compensation Equities Incentives |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Standard agency predictors about how performance measures are optimally weighted to provide CEO incentives are empirically examined. It is documented that the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO cash pay is a decreasing function of the relative variances. Agency theory speaks to the weights in total compensation (annual total pay and changes in the CEOs' equity portfolio value), however, and it is documented that very little of CEOs' total incentives come from cash pay. |
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