haku: @journal_id 109 / yhteensä: 867
viite: 319 / 867
| Tekijä: | Holden, S. |
| Otsikko: | Wage bargaining, holdout, and inflation |
| Lehti: | Oxford Economic Papers
1997 : APR, VOL. 49:2, p. 235-255 |
| Asiasana: | PAY BARGAINING INFLATION COSTS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | It is customary in many countries that production continues under the old contract terms during wage negotiations (holdout), unless a work stoppage is initiated. This article analyses a model where the workers deliberately work less efficiently during a holdout,while the firm may reduce bonus payments. The wage bargaining will result in a nominal wage increase if a holdout is more costly to the firm than to the workers. Wage inflation can only be prevented if the firm can credibly threaten to close the plant. Threats to close the plant are only credible when unemploment is high. |
SCIMA