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| Tekijä: | Posen, A. |
| Otsikko: | Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link ? |
| Lehti: | Oxford Economic Papers
1998 : JUL, VOL. 50:3, p. 335-359 |
| Asiasana: | Central banks Monetary policy Inflation OECD |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Granting central banks independence is widely assumed to decrease inflation by increasing the credibility of commitments to price stability. The paper analyzes public-sector and private-sector behaviour in a sample set of 17 OECD countries for evidence of variations in disinflationary credibility with monetary institutions. The paper does not find evidence that the costs of disinflation are lower in countries with independent central banks. It also does not find evidence that independence inhibits collection of seignorage revenues or electoral manipulation of policy. The results of the paper raise questions about explanations of the negative correlation btw. central bank independence and inflation. |
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