haku: @journal_id 109 / yhteensä: 867
viite: 204 / 867
| Tekijä: | Denicolo, V. |
| Otsikko: | Sequential innovation and the patent-antitrust conflict |
| Lehti: | Oxford Economic Papers
2002 : OCT, VOL. 54:4, p. 649-668 |
| Asiasana: | Antitrust Policy Patents Innovation Models |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This study examines antitrust policy in a model of cumulative innovation, arguing that collusion btw. successive patentees (e.g. through patent pools) may be socially beneficial under certain circumstances, even if the patents involved are competing rather than complementary or blocking. Collusion stimulates investment in 2nd generation innovations, which is welfare-improving if their social returns exceed private returns. However, it discourages investment in first-generation innovations. Thus, for the pooling of subsequent patents to be beneficial, the non-appropriable returns from the second innovation must be large and it must be costly to achieve by comparison with the first. |
SCIMA