haku: @author Denicoló, V. / yhteensä: 9
viite: 7 / 9
| Tekijä: | Delbono, F. Denicolo, V. |
| Otsikko: | Regulating innovative activity: The role of a public firm. |
| Lehti: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
1993 : MAR, VOL. 11:1, p. 35-48 |
| Asiasana: | REGULATIONS INNOVATION COMPANIES R&D MODELS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Without spillovers and under the "winner-take-all" hypothesis, there is overinvestment in R&D in a non-competitive equilibrium due to duplication of effort. We show that a public firm can represent an effective instrument in the hands of a policymaker to mitigate such a problem. In particular, it is proved that, in a mixed duopoly: (i) each firm invests less than in a private duopoly, and (ii) although the expected time of innovation is postponed, social welfare is higher than in a private duopoly. |
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