haku: @author Innes, R. / yhteensä: 9
viite: 7 / 9
| Tekijä: | Innes, R. |
| Otsikko: | Financial contracting under risk neutrality, limited liability and ex ante asymmetric information |
| Lehti: | Economica
1993 : FEB, VOL. 60:237, p. 27-40 |
| Asiasana: | RISK BEHAVIOUR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS INFORMATION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Equilibrium financial contract forms are derived in a risk-neutral capital market with asymmetrically informed borrowers/entrepreneurs and investors. The analysis generalizes the work of DeMeza and Webb (1987) by allowing for arbitrary profit distributions, arbitrary contract forms and variable investment choices. It is shown that when higher-quality entrepreneurs have "better" ex post profit distributions (in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio property), equilibrium contracts take a standard debt form so long as admissible investor payoff functions are monotone non-decreasing in firm profit. Without the monotonicity constraint, contracts often take a different, "live-or-die "form. |
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