haku: @author Radner, R. / yhteensä: 9
viite: 5 / 9
| Tekijä: | Dutta, P. Radner, R. |
| Otsikko: | Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: a characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency |
| Lehti: | Economic Theory
1994 : VOL. 4:4, p. 483-503 |
| Asiasana: | EFFICIENCY INCENTIVES AGENCY THEORY |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | In this paper the authors study a repeated principal-agent situation with moral hazard. They focus on a class of incentive schemes, called bankruptcy contracts. The agent is "scored" in each period, and is paid a fixed wage per period until the current score falls to zero, at which time the agent is terminated and the principal hires a new agent. The agent's current score at any time equals an an initial score, plus the total output up to that time, minus an amount that is proportional to the total time. |
SCIMA