haku: @author Sengupta, K. / yhteensä: 9
viite: 5 / 9
| Tekijä: | Dasgupta, S. Sengupta, K. |
| Otsikko: | Optimal regulation of MNEs and government revenues |
| Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
1995 : OCT, VOL. 58:2, p. 215-234 |
| Asiasana: | REGULATIONS ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION TRANSFER PRICING |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The paper analyzes the optimal regulation of multinational enterprises (MNEs) by a host government interested in maximizing tax revenues, when the MNE has private information about its benefits of controlling the enterprise. It is shown that the optimal mechanism involves restricting the MNE's ownership of the enterprise, and setting a ceiling on the transfer price of an input that the MNE provides that is above the known production cost of the input. |
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