haku: @author Wooton, I. / yhteensä: 9
viite: 5 / 9
| Tekijä: | Ludema, R. D. Wooton, I. |
| Otsikko: | International trade rules and environmental cooperation under asymmetric information |
| Lehti: | International Economic Review
1997 : AUG, VOL. 38:3, p. 605-625 |
| Asiasana: | INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATIONS ENVIRONMENT CO-OPERATION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Countries will rely too heavily on trade policy in controlling cross-border externalities in negotiated agreements, with asymmetric information about local costs relative to international benefits of direct environmental policy. An exporter chooses the unilateral external policy before negotiations providing a signal about its local cost, and modifying the information used in negotiations. The greater the exporter's incentive to use an externality tax as a second-best trade instrument, the better the signal. Exogenous limits on the unilateral use of trade policy in the absence of environmental cooperation may diminish the informational problem and improve the prospective environmental agreements' performance. |
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