haku: @author Repullo, R. / yhteensä: 9
viite: 6 / 9
| Tekijä: | Repullo, R. Suarez, J. |
| Otsikko: | Monitoring, liquidation, and security design |
| Lehti: | Review of Financial Studies
1998 : SPRING, VOL. 11:1, p. 163-187 |
| Asiasana: | LIQUIDATION SECURITY MARKETS INFORMATION MORAL HAZARD |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper discusses optimal security design in the context of a model of entrepreneurial forms' financing. Alternatives are considered for raising finance: informed, uninformed and a mixture of both. The key role of informed finance is to impose a credible threat of liquidation. However the credibility of the threat fails when liquidation values are low, in which case a mixture of informed/uninformed finance may be optimal and informed debt will be secured and senior to uninformed debt. Uninformed finance may be identified with the placing of publicly traded securities in the market and informed finance with either bank lending or the issuance of thightly held securities. |
SCIMA