haku: @author Athey, S. / yhteensä: 9
viite: 2 / 9
| Tekijä: | Athey, S. Bagwell, K. |
| Otsikko: | Optimal collusion with private information |
| Lehti: | RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : AUTUMN, VOL. 32:3, p. 428-465 |
| Asiasana: | COSTS INFORMATION |
| Vapaa asiasana: | OPTIMAL COLLUSION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors analyze collusion in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, where prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. Productive efficiency is possible only if high-cost firms relinquish market share. |
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