haku: @author Innes, R. / yhteensä: 9
viite: 3 / 9
| Tekijä: | Innes, R. |
| Otsikko: | Stochastic Pollution, Costly Sanctions, and Optimality of Emission Permit Banking |
| Lehti: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2003 : MAY, VOL. 45:3, p. 546-568 |
| Asiasana: | ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE POLLUTION CONTROL POLLUTION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | In recent times, marketable emission permit systems, both in the US and internationally, have specified a variety of different rules that allow for some "banking" or "borrowing" of emission allowances over time. For example, the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments allow Emission Vehicle Program allows firms to bank permits from 1 year to the next at a 50 percent discount. This paper identifies a new economic motive for pollution regulations that allow polluting firms to bank and borrow emission permits over time. When aggregate pollution is stochastic, an intertemporal permit trading regime can provide firms with efficient incentives for pollution abatement without the need for costly government enforcement actions that would otherwise be required. |
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