haku: @author Banerjee, A. / yhteensä: 9
viite: 5 / 9
| Tekijä: | Banerjee, A. Besley, T. |
| Otsikko: | Moral hazard, limited liability and taxation: A principal-agent model |
| Lehti: | Oxford Economic Papers
1990 : JAN, VOL. 42:1, p. 46-60 |
| Asiasana: | TAXATION GOVERNMENT INSURANCE MARKETS RISK |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | When markets are incomplete, it is almost always possible for the government to use tax and transfer policies to effect a Pareto improvement. Optimal tax interventions are considered when insurance markets are incomplete. By taxing the returns from a risky endeavour and using this revenue to finance a certain expenditure level, the government can simulate the returns from an insurance contract. Policies of this kind are analysed in a model where there is moral hazard, that is, an agent makes a privately observed effort choice which affects the riskiness of outcomes. |
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