haku: @indexterm Future / yhteensä: 937
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| Tekijä: | Tashjian, E. Weissman, M. |
| Otsikko: | Advantages to competing with yourself: why an exchange might design futures contracts with correlated payoffs |
| Lehti: | Journal of Financial Intermediation
1995 : APR, VOL. 4:2, p. 133-157 |
| Asiasana: | FUTURE CONTRACTS REVENUE |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper examines the form of futures contracts which a monopolistic exchange will offer to maximize transaction revenue when transaction fees are endogenuously determined. The authors establish the desirable characteristics of participants in contracts. For example, they show that contracts which appeal to hedgers on one side of the market and to speculators on the other are desirable. In contrast to earlier work, the authors show that the sequentially selected set of contracts may not be optimal. |
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