haku: @journal_id 789 / yhteensä: 95
viite: 58 / 95
| Tekijä: | Persons, J. |
| Otsikko: | Liars never prosper? How management misrepresentation reduces monitoring costs |
| Lehti: | Journal of Financial Intermediation
1997 : OCT, VOL. 6:4, p. 269-306 |
| Asiasana: | MANAGEMENT COSTS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | When monitoring is not contractible -- so investors monitor only when, at that time, they expect to benefit from doing so -- efficient contracts sometimes induce managers to make false reports to investors. Because of monitoring discretion, management misrepresentation can produce Pareto improvements by reducing monitoring costs. When costs of negotiation are small, optimal contracts necessarily induce misrepresentation. Discretionary monitoring also generates an equilibrium role for multiple-security capital structures. When an optimal contract has two investors, securityholder conflict arises endogenously as a means of reducing monitoring costs. |
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