haku: @journal_id 1399 / yhteensä: 95
viite: 32 / 95
Tekijä:Lyon, T.P.
Otsikko:Quality competition, insurance, and consumer choice in health care markets
Lehti:Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
1999 : WINTER, VOL. 8:4, p. 545-580
Asiasana:Health
Service
Markets
Quality
Competition
Insurance
Consumer choice
Models
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:In this model, insurance offering a choice of hospitals is valued because consumers are uncertain which hospital they will prefer ex-post. A competitive insurance market facilitates tacit price collusion btw. hospitals. High margins induce hospitals to compete for customers through over-investment in quality. Incentives may exist to lock in market share through managed-care plans with less choice and lower prices. As technology becomes more expensive, the market increasingly offers too little choice. A pure managed care market may emerge, with underinvestment in quality. Relative to a pure insurance regime, however, all consumers are better-off under managed care.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 214237
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