haku: @journal_id 789 / yhteensä: 95
viite: 21 / 95
| Tekijä: | Chiesa, G. |
| Otsikko: | Incentive-Based Lending Capacity, Competition, and Regulation in Banking |
| Lehti: | Journal of Financial Intermediation
2001 : JAN, VOL. 10:1, p. 28-53 |
| Asiasana: | COMPETITION BANKING REGULATIONS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper studies moral hazard in banking due to delegated monitoring in an environment of aggregate risk and examines its implications for credit market equilibrium and regulation, in a model where banks are price competitors for loans and deposits. It provides a rationale for an incentive-based lending capacity positively linked to the bank's capital and profit margin, for an oligopolistic market structure wherever banks have market power, and for capital requirements. Social- welfare-maximizing capital requirements are lowered in recessions, are higher the more fragmented the banking sector, and are increased when anti-competitive measures are removed. In equilibrium banks earn excessive profits and credit may be rationed. |
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