haku: @author Mookherjee, D. / yhteensä: 13
viite: 5 / 13
| Tekijä: | Kahn, C. Mookherjee, D. |
| Otsikko: | Market failure with moral hazard and side trading |
| Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
1995 : OCT, VOL. 58:2, p. 159-184 |
| Asiasana: | MARKETS TRADE MORAL HAZARD |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper compares full-information insurance markets with (a) markets where accident-reducing effort levels are unverifiable but trades between every pair of agents are verifiable and (b) markets where neither effort nor trades are verifiable. Markets are represented by a contracting game, with a solution concept allowing coordination among coalitions through information- constrained contracts. Each informational setting yields a correspondence between market outcomes and the appropriate notion of constrained efficiency in a social planner's problem. |
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