haku: @author Schjelderup, G. / yhteensä: 7
viite: 6 / 7
| Tekijä: | Konrad, K. A. Schjelderup, G. |
| Otsikko: | Fortress building in global tax competition |
| Lehti: | Journal of Urban Economics
1999 : JUL, VOL. 46:1, p. 156-167 |
| Asiasana: | Taxation Competition Equilibrium analysis Models |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | It is studied in the paper whether a group of countries can gain from harmonizing their capital income taxes if the rest of the world does not follow suit. It is shown that cooperation among the subgroup of countries is beneficial if tax rates in the initial fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium are strategic complements. In this case tax harmonization among a subset of countries is Pareto improving for all countries. |
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